

4. Addressing Security Issues in Treaties and other International Agreements

4.1 INTRODUCTION

A decision or proposal to implement a TBCA between two or more adjoining countries brings with it a suite of security considerations because international borders are under discussion and, in particular, a 'softening' of these international borders or easier flow of people and wildlife is being proposed. Political support for such a TBCA initiative within the partner countries brings with it expectations of progress and delivery of outputs towards implementation of the TBCA, so while the departments responsible for security issues may have legitimate concerns they will nevertheless usually be under some pressure to collaborate. This is where the problems start arising. Concept plans for TBCAs are usually initiated and shaped by conservationists, who do not always necessarily have a full awareness of the security ramifications brought about by their proposals, and therefore do not involve the security stakeholders sufficiently early in the planning process. If the Ministers or other political leaders responsible for environmental and conservation matters within the countries taking part in the TBCA have achieved broad agreement, they then have to gain the support of their Cabinet colleagues in the respective countries, and this is sometimes the first time that the Ministers of Defence, Police etc learn about such a TBCA initiative, and the need for their departments to become involved. These ministers responsible for national security are invariably powerful figures, and have the potential to override or delay any TBCA plans, so if they receive feedback from within their own departments that inadequate consultations and processes have been followed between the conservation and security departments without due consideration to security issues, unnecessary frictions and delays could result. For a variety of reasons, all related to optimising the processes and eventual products emerging from stakeholder consultations and all contributing to successful implementation and management of a TBCA, it is simply good practice to involve the various security departments from as early as possible in the TBCA planning process.

Collaborative planning between the conservationists, security and other TBCA stakeholders from an early stage allows for early identification of security ramifications brought about by the implementation of a TBCA, and allows time for proper discussions and development of mutually acceptable solutions or mechanisms to manage security issues. Perhaps most importantly, it allows the proper formulation of Articles and Clauses for inclusion in Memoranda of Understanding, Treaties or other internationally binding commitments between the partner countries, so that all parties have a clear understanding of the security issues and how these will be dealt with.

Because situations vary in different countries and regions, the security issues and how they will be resolved will also vary, but some of the more important issues which are likely to be of a generic nature are highlighted below. These and other issues will have to be discussed by security representatives from all of the partner countries, and consensus reached on how to deal with these matters *before* the TBCA is implemented.


4.2 THE QUESTION OF SCALE.

Security issues vary in their nature and importance, and they have to be dealt with accordingly. So, for example, petty shoplifting is as valid a security concern as international

drug smuggling, but the issues clearly have different priorities and national impact. The various security stakeholders will not only have to identify the security issues which become relevant in TBCA planning, they will also have to decide at which level to deal with them.

Some security issues will need to be agreed on and are so important that they may have to be embedded within the highest International Treaty signed between the partner countries (e.g extradition; harmonising of legislation; institutional representation by security stakeholders, etc), while some other issues are perhaps less contentious and can be taken up within the Joint Management Plan which guides the collaborative management of the overall TBCA (e.g. 'hot pursuit' arrangements; joint patrols; cross-border security liaison mechanisms; border closure hours; etc), while some security matters may by agreement be left as internal decisions within particular component areas making up the TBCA (prevention of shoplifting; etc). Figure 4.1 broadly depicts the process of TBCA formation and the various agreements or formal commitments between partner countries. Security issues need to be addressed at each of these levels.

FIGURE 4.1: KEY MILESTONES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING TBCA FORMATION



4.3 SECURITY ISSUES WHICH COMMONLY ARISE FROM TBCA AGREEMENTS

This section should be read in conjunction with the discussion under 2.2.5 earlier in this Manual.

4.3.1 Extradition

Many countries already have regional agreements regarding extradition, but TBCA planners need to verify what the legal stipulations entail. The need for this arises as each country has sovereign laws which may differ from those of an adjoining country, and criminals may cross the international boundary to exploit these differences. One obvious example relates to criminals attempting to escape pursuing law enforcement officials, and if necessary to be captured in a country which has more lenient laws or penalties. If a criminal commits a crime in country A and moves into and is captured by TBCA officials in country B, these officials need to know what arrangements are in place to deal with the situation. Where extradition agreements already exist between countries this will be reflected within some document which should be available to and understood by TBCA security officials. In the absence of such an agreement some undertaking should be captured within the International Treaty establishing the TBCA.

4.3.2 Evidence

If a criminal is being prosecuted in country A but critical evidence resides in country B, then the legality of the moving of evidence from the one country to another may in some cases also become a matter of potential dispute. Security officials should be aware of this and preferably pre-emptively agree on what can or should be done in such events.

4.3.3 Use of Force

Countries tend to differ substantially in the degree of freedom which security forces have to use force to affect an arrest. In many countries 'minimum force' is legally stipulated and enforced, while in others a blind eye is taken and in yet others a 'shoot-on-sight' approach is permissible in some cases. Some understanding needs to be reached between security officials working within a TBCA as to the handling of criminals crossing the boundary, whether the understanding is to adopt the practice of the country with the most stringent legal requirement, or to simply apply the measures in practice within the country in which the pursuit and arrest is being made. This may need to be included in a legal document, Memorandum of Understanding or in the Joint Management Plan.

4.3.4 Jurisdiction

Every country has its own legal system and each country has sovereign rights within its borders. While two or more countries may engage in a TBCA and all fences and artificial barriers between these countries be removed, this by no means implies that any of the partner countries has relinquished any measure of sovereignty or rights. The jurisdiction of security personnel therefore stops at the point where two countries meet, and formal agreements will have to have been made which guide and dictate what actions are permissible in the event that criminals are being pursued and cross from one country to another. If such agreements are lacking, or have not been properly ratified by partner countries, then officials from country A are obliged to cease pursuit of a criminal the moment that criminal crosses the boundary. Clearly, some agreement needs to be documented to avoid such situations.

4.3.5 Standardization

Each country participating in the TBCA is likely to have its own standards, equipment and methods based on historical development, and also systems to cope with security situations. However, to give effect to the objectives of a TBCA, which in large measure is to achieve

joint management or at least harmonized or compatible management of the adjoining component areas, there will be great advantage in striving for some measure of standardisation or narrowing the differences in procedures etc which exist between the security forces of the partner countries. Not the least of these is the need to develop agreement on lines of communication so that security operators can talk to each other, which means standardized language, equipment, radio channels, etc. However, for the purposes of this discussion what is meant here are higher order issues which require agreement and perhaps need to be captured within an International Treaty, MoU or Joint Management Plan. Such issues may be the cause of significant friction or resentment and lead to a breakdown in collaboration, and could be caused by something as simple as differences in salary structures between comparable security forces on either side of the boundary. Pursuit and arrest of criminals is complicated when security elements of one country have operating standards which are well below that of an adjoining country, and this situation could be at least partially resolved by agreeing on joint training courses. Mutually agreeable Codes of Discipline also contribute towards harmonious collaboration and improved cross-border security.

4.3.6 Harmonisation of Laws and Regulations

The need to review disparate and often conflicting legislation has been discussed elsewhere in this Manual, but bears repeating here. While some principles relating to this issue may need to be included in the International Treaty or equivalent legal instrument which establishes the TBCA, there are many issues which need to be addressed at lower level and which are essential to the smooth functioning of the TBCA. Some of these include having to agree on standardized times of travel by tourists within the TBCA (imagine a tourist travelling in TBCA component A where travel is allowed until 8pm, but is unaware that travel times are restricted and gates close at 6pm in TBCA component B where such a tourist may have reserved accommodation). Other examples are differences in speed restrictions within a TBCA and associated speeding fines within different component areas of a TBCA. Punishment for the same offence may differ dramatically between countries as well, and may cause poachers to focus their activities in one component of the TBCA which is in a country having more lenient fines than the other. Most of these agreements between officials managing a TBCA should be reached *before* the TBCA is established, and these agreements should ideally be embedded within the Joint Management Plan which guides the overall management of the combined TBCA.

4.3.7 Border Crossings

The immigration departments and also officials responsible for Customs and Excise of each of the countries participating in the TBCA will have a major say in discussions and eventual agreements relating to the placement, staffing and functioning of points at which tourists and goods may cross between these partner countries, and may also insist that such agreements be taken up either in the Establishment Treaty or Joint Management Plan. The factors which influence these decisions and agreements have been discussed at some length earlier in this Manual, and are of fundamental importance as to how tourist flow will occur within the TBCA and also between partner countries.

4.3.8 Emergency Management

Given the nature of a TBCA where border fences are removed and particularly if free flow of people occurs within the boundaries of the TBCA, it becomes desirable to have a centralized security management centre or at least some mechanism which ensures that in times of a crisis - such as a busload of visitors from country A having fallen off a bridge in country B – a 'virtual' Security Emergency Management Centre can be established which links the top or relevant security officials from the countries involved. This will require pre-agreed procedures

and infrastructure being in place, and is best achieved if the principle of co-operative management is embedded in the International Treaty and the details of Security collaboration are explicitly agreed on and elaborated in the Joint Management Plan.

4.3.9 Airspace control

Aircraft are used in protected areas for a variety of reasons, including aerial census of wildlife stocks, research purposes, game capture operations, fire-fighting, crime-fighting, routine patrol, and also in some cases to ferry tourists from international or other airports to their accommodations within the TBCA. In addition to these flights, there will also be a need either routinely or exceptionally for commercial, military or other flights to overfly the TBCA. It may be part of the agreement during the establishment of the TBCA that such flights can now be undertaken throughout the entire area of the TBCA, but to avoid misunderstandings and ensure some standardisation the following aspects should be given consideration:

4.3.9.1 Minimum Flight Heights

Agreement should be reached on standardised flying heights to be maintained when flying within the airspace over the TBCA. Many protected areas have negotiated agreements with civil aviation authorities that commercial or sport flights may not take place over such protected areas, except in the case of international flights which fly very high at a level which does not create a disturbance to either wildlife or tourists. If exceptions are to be allowed, these instances should be agreed on and the conditions clearly stipulated.

4.3.9.2 Official Internal Flights

Rules and guidelines for aircraft on official work-related flights should be developed in conjunction with all security stakeholders, including in particular those from Immigration as well as Customs & Excise. Aircraft provide ideal opportunities for smuggling of various goods, including drugs and weapons. Such agreement should include details regarding route notification or flight plans, who should be informed regarding intended flights, who may authorize such flights and where are records kept and who/where can enquiries be directed in the event of suspicious flights, what are the passport or visa implications of cross-border flights, passenger lists and what are the guidelines regarding landing fees and other costs. Clearly, the issue of flight co-ordination is potentially complex and needs to be very clearly stipulated within the Joint Management Plan. This issue again serves as motivation for some form of Central Security Management or Central Security Co-ordination facility or mechanism.

4.3.9.3 Private aircraft

In some protected areas it is permissible for tourists or other guests to enter by private aircraft, and these arrangements will have to be discussed during the planning phase of a TBCA, and clear understanding be reached as to operational rules regarding use of private aircraft overflying TBCA airspace.

4.3.9.4 International Flights

It may be that a TBCA has landing facilities which make it possible for aircraft to fly directly from a foreign country, whether carrying freight or passengers. These arrangements, if permitted, will have to be stipulated and mutually acceptable guidelines included in the Joint Management Plan.

4.3.9.5 Roads and Bridges

Irrespective of the source of funding for particular roads and bridges, the right to free and unobstructed use of such infrastructure by appropriate security forces or elements having a legitimate need to do should be included in the international TBCA Establishment Treaty. Furthermore, it should be understood and agreed in writing that in cases of need, security elements will have the right to close and secure any road or bridge or other infrastructure relating to access, and to stop and search vehicles. Where such roads or bridges provide

access to the border and materially affect the adjoining country, such implications need to be discussed and processes of operations agreed upon.

4.3.9.6 *Integrated Information Technology Data Exchange*

While the overall principle of co-operation between security and other officials should be embedded within the TBCA Establishment Treaty, the details thereof should be stipulated within the Joint Management Plan. This includes a section devoted to the degree to which state departments or other TBCA units are willing to share information and have access to databases, as well as the procedures and mechanisms involved. The ideal would be that all immigration and policing matters related to people entering the TBCA should be captured on one database or linked in a compatible manner and accessible to all appropriate officials within the broader TBCA. The implications of this are that all officials operating at individual protected area access points (gates, airfields, harbours), border control points, base stations, and even key patrol stations, should have access to such information by means of radio or computer. Not only does such a situation allow rapid tracking of known or suspected criminals, allow early warning of wrongdoers heading in a particular direction, but it helps in many other ways such as allowing management staff to determine when the daily visitor capacity of the area has been reached, at very short notice.

4.3.9.7 *Radio communications*

Agreement should be reached between security personnel operating within the different countries making up the TBCA – and even between agencies in the same country – regarding radio compatibility, frequencies and procedures to enable clear lines of communication between security officials. This may need to be captured within the Joint Management Plan.

BOX 4.1: POLICE COOPERATION ON INTERNATIONAL BORDERS IN EUROPE: GERMAN - FRENCH TRANSBOUNDARY COOPERATION IN THE REGION OF THE UPPER RHINE VALLEY

Political and Legal Foundations

The first inter-governmental agreement on German-French police cooperation was signed in 1977. With strengthened establishment of the European Union during the 1990s, the development of transboundary police cooperation between the two countries was greatly expanded.

As a follow-up of the 'European Union Treaty of Maastricht', in 1992 a convention on the daily cooperation between German and French police stations in the border area was agreed on.

The Schengen Agreement came into force in 1995 which in a step-wise process reduced border controls until complete abolition. Consequently transboundary police cooperation became more and more important, particularly in border regions.

Finally, the Agreement of Baden-Baden in 1995 and the Treaty of Mondorf in 1997 declared the establishment of German-French commissionerships (which are also the basis of cooperation for the federal and national border police as well as for the customs authorities), thereby fostering the development of very concrete and practical ways of cooperation along and across the border.

In 2002 the Convention of Mannheim facilitated the transboundary police-station cooperation in the Rhine Valley area.

The Different Forms of Cooperation

Current cooperation in the region takes place at different levels and in different areas, based on European treaties, supra-regional, regional, sub-regional and local agreements. Some examples of best practice include:

- ❑ *Administration:*
In 1999 Germany and France inaugurated a joint administrative centre in Offenburg. Here German and French police-officers work closely together under the same roof. Their main tasks are to gather, analyze and exchange relevant information, in order to perform joint assessments of specific problem-situations.
- ❑ *Specific Operational Situations:*
The national police stations exchange all necessary documents and information across the border. German and French policemen use compatible radioset-systems. Each country sends liaison-agents to the neighbouring police-station, and they exchange advisors and observers.
- ❑ *Education, Training and Advanced Training:*
The language barrier is only a minor problem, as most of the German and French policemen speak and understand their neighbour's language or at least regional or local dialect.

A bigger problem is the cultural-based difference in perception of what security is. This is manifest in different legal and judicial structures and day-to-day applications. Each of the partners has the challenge of accepting and respecting the other's "culture of security and police".

As a consequence the 'EURO-Institute for Transboundary Cooperation' (see *box*) offers workshops and seminars to German and French police-officers to improve understanding of their colleagues' organisation, culture and work-system. In addition, the national police-academies are increasingly organizing and facilitating cross-border exchanges.

The Council of Europe has decided on the establishment of a European Police Academy which will offer advanced training especially to high ranking police officers.

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5. The Security Planning Process

5.1 INTRODUCTION

A specific security challenge needs first to be properly understood if an optimal solution and approach is to be developed. The elements making up the particular security problem or challenge may also have to be compartmentalized so as to allocate priorities and associated funding. Theft of small items from accommodation units is clearly a different order of magnitude to the challenge presented by masses of refugees flooding in from an adjoining war-torn country. But if the pilfering were to escalate then its particular priority rating may also change. Confronting crime and other security challenges in a TBCA should therefore be an ongoing process of monitoring and review, and security activities must ideally be measurable in some manner to assess efficiency, and justify outputs relative to funding. A shifting array of security threats and crises means that TBCA managers and other authorities will have to engage in a continuous series of exercises to address the issues, and some of the more generic processes are discussed below.

5.2 DEFINITIONS

The following terms and concepts will be used during this discussion, and are used in the following contexts:

- 5.2.1 *Plan*: The plan represents a coherent, holistic and detailed integrated method of how a proposed exercise is to be executed in order to address a particular problem. It integrates all the courses of action proposed to and selected by the senior authority, and includes the support courses of action (those elements which assist the main effort by means of logistics, blocking forces, aircraft usage, legal actions etc).
- 5.2.2 *Campaign planning*: A campaign is usually a series of related operations designed to achieve either a crime goal or a strategic end state (e.g. an acceptable level of crime within the TBCA).
- 5.2.3 *Operation*: An operation is either a single or a series of related anti-crime actions implemented over a defined period of time to achieve a clear single aim within the scope of the planned campaign.
- 5.2.4 *End State*: That state reached at the end of a campaign that has achieved the desired result.
- 5.2.5 *Centre of Gravity*: That aspect, item, or feature which is so vital and so critical that without it an organization cannot continue or succeed in its purpose.
- 5.2.6 *Decisive Point*: This is a tangible event, possibly one of many such decisive points along a chain of events – called a line of operation – the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the successful elimination of an opponent's centre of gravity.
- 5.2.7 *Decision Point*: This is a point in time along a line of operation when a major decision on the next series of actions needs to be taken, as a result of a critical point in a situation being reached as planned. A decision point can also occur during a decisive point.
- 5.2.8 *Line of Operation*: A Line of Operation comprises a series of decision points, linked in an order of sequence to achieve an objective, and constitutes a direct path to a defined opponent's centre of gravity, and thereafter leads on to the campaign end state where it meets up with other lines of operation. A campaign will most likely have at least four lines of operation and each line represents an independent and specific action needed to reach the campaign end state.
- 5.2.9 *Sequencing*: An arrangement of events or decision points that need to be carried out in a set sequence to attain an objective.

5.2.10 *Phase*: The logical breakdown of an operation into useful segments to make the plan more readily understood.

5.2.11 *Focus of Main Effort (FME)*: The senior authority having appreciated where the best and most sensitive point or place of his opponent's structure/ organisation/operation is, decides to concentrate that degree of force necessary at that point and at a particular time, to successfully conclude an operation or phase of operation. This is called the focus of main effort. It is possible to have one FME per line of operation and one main one for a campaign.

5.3 CAMPAIGN LINES OF OPERATION: CHARACTERISTICS.

Lines of Operation are products of a process of analysis of the entire campaign. Lines of Operation include not only the planned operations but also any contingency plans that may have been developed to cover possible shortfalls in the main plan. It allows for one line per operation, and ultimately linking together all operations and joint decision points and centres of gravity. Decision points, decisive points, centres of gravity and focus of main effort are synchronised per line. 'Joint links' indicate activities directed against joint decisive points *en route* to the campaign centre of gravity. Foci of main effort are linked by a critical path depicting where the senior campaign authority wishes to focus attention and where to exploit success by deploying reserve forces.

FIGURE 5.1 LINES OF OPERATION DIAGRAM




TABLE 5.1 EXAMPLE OF A “TASK TABLE” THAT SUPPORTS “LINES OF OPERATION DIAGRAM”

Operational Line	Task	Human & other resources	Responsible authority
Air Support	A1. Air-lift of agents A2. Aerial observation of target area A3. Airlift secondary agents A4. Air support to P2 A5. Air support to P3 Standby Medivac Command and Control A6. Medivac injured	? x 'X' light aircraft ? x 'Y' helicopters, one of which fitted for Medivac	Operational Chief in Charge (CIC)
Police	P1. Operational deployments start D day at 05h00; surround & take over poacher bases, aided by Rangers P2. Find & destroy traps P3. Mop up of area P4. Consolidation	? x police members; ? x detectives; ? x 'sniffer' dogs Detectives & dogs depart	Police Chief; liaises with CIC
Rangers	R1. Assist police; identify poacher bases etc R2. Deploy to escape routes & block such routes R3. Investigate evidence & support police	? x rangers per police group; ? x personnel as reserve ? x rangers per escape route; ? x personnel as reserve All personnel involved	Police Chief
Intelligence operatives	I1. Deploy D –5 to gain information I2. Confirmation & observation of Target Area; guide forces in I3. Confirm/Establish effect of operations and social implications	? x operatives ? x 'X' helicopters	Operational CIC
Medical	M1. Medics to accompany operational deployments; start D-Day at 05h00. Aid post at operational HQ ready D-Day –2 days. M2. Continue deployment & assistance as required	? x doctor in base ? x medics with each police group	Police Chief; liaises with doctor
Socio-economic measures	S1. Deploy into target area and monitor results; determine any new capacity building or upliftment tasks and assist target groups to achieve such aims S2. Continue tasks and prepare feedback reports as well as Effect Analysis	? x skilled persons per target area	TFCA CEO
Media	M1. Conduct media & needs analysis prior to and during operation. Prepare Press Releases plus photos. Assist & safeguard Press in area. M2. Continuously monitor situation & keep CEO and CIC updated. All Press Releases to be approved CEO & CIC.	? x Media Team per Police Group once operation in advanced/final stages. ? x Public Relations Officer designated and responsible for dealing with Press.	CEO at Base; liaises with Police Chief & Operational CIC

5.4 PLANNING LEVELS

At the Campaign level, the security forces in consultation with other senior members of TBCA management need to determine what their strategic end state should be over the medium to long term. Woven into this will be political imperatives from the various countries involved. For example, if poaching is perceived as a high priority threat to the TBCA — which could result in reduced foreign funding, tourism and therefore a direct effect on state finances — then political involvement is unavoidable. At the national strategic level the state will demand that something be done about the problem. This translates into a goal for the TBCA management staff. The security forces will therefore need to develop a “campaign” plan to deal with the problem.

The operational level links the strategic *WHAT* (overall campaign goal) to the *HOW* (how it can be achieved), the latter being the tactical actions required at ground level. The operational level also requires that the *WHO*, *WHEN*, *WHERE* and *WHAT THEREAFTER* (the actions that take place after, or as a result of the operation) aspects of a plan be developed. The operational level will yield the broad plan that will need to be refined into the tactical action plan so as to give effect to the strategic direction received from senior management level.

The operational level CIC or Chief in Charge (CIC) could be the Chief Intelligence Officer (CIO) or Chief Security Officer (CSO) of the park or even in certain circumstances an outside security official from the police or military. The operational level CIC must be able to develop a plan in the same way that a musician writes a piece of music, although in this instance the operational level CIC must also play the part of conductor as well. The campaign is the baton in the hands of the operational level CIC and uses it to achieve the strategic results that are required through effective deployment of the tactical forces at ground level.

An expectation many people often have is to demand results within an unrealistic short period of time. Today's decisions may only bear fruit in a week or month's time or even longer, because of the uncertain and unpredictable security environment the TBCA finds itself in. At the same time the operational level CIC will have to keep his or her superiors and politicians satisfied as they wait for results from more junior levels, who are implementing tactical plans derived from the operational plan!

5.5 PLANNING PRINCIPLES

In planning and directing the campaign, the operational level CIC should – to the extent possible – adhere to a number of guiding principles which assist in giving effect to his or her plans. These principles are:

- 5.5.1 *Conformance to Strategic Goals.* Ensure that the intentions and campaign end state are clearly conveyed to subordinates and are also in line with strategic directives received from higher authority.
- 5.5.2 *Correct Application of Subordinate Abilities:* The operational level CIC must ensure that the plan and end state are understood by subordinates and within their ability to achieve.
- 5.5.3 *Apply Medium to Long Campaign Vision:* The operational level CIC should not become bogged down with the nitty gritty daily planning and operational problems, but rather ensure that the strategic goals are being attained by the tactical activities of the deployed forces.
- 5.5.4 *Utilize Integrated Tactics to Obtain the Strategic End State:* The operational level CIC should use all the available security force ‘instruments’ to achieve the Strategic End State. These instruments need to be correctly trained or

harnessed, integrated correctly and concentrated at the correct point to be most effective against the criminal or other threat.

5.5.5 *Maintenance of the Initiative by Flexible Use of Reserves:* The freedom to operate against a threat will depend on the availability of sufficient people to do the job. The judicious application of reserves at the right time and place can often result in a favourable situation being developed, and ensures the ability to exploit the situation as it develops. In this way the initiative or advantage can be taken from the criminal and exploited to the benefit of security personnel.

5.5.6 *Acceptance of Affordable Risks:* The operational level CIC should bear in mind that there will never be a 'perfect moment' to implement a plan. Every situation carries with it its own inherent risks and if the CIC waits for a better moment the initiative can be lost and this may result in precisely those losses the CIC intended to avoid. The ability to take calculated risks will allow the CIC to 'steal a march' on the opponent and mark out a successful leader from the unsuccessful ones.

5.6 PLANNING GUIDELINES

Planning is by far the most important responsibility of the operational level CIC. The Planning Process initially aims at conceiving a campaign plan using a process of analysis with appropriate staff to ensure that all relevant facts are available to the CIC during formulation of the plan. The campaign plan should address the full duration of the campaign which may still be weeks or even months ahead. The plan must give attention to both the *WHAT* and the *HOW* at the strategic level and also analyse through to tactical level how the plan will be implemented. The operational level CIC has to ensure that the plan will work at the coal-face. This is only possible if all variables have been assessed and reasonable assurance obtained that sufficient resources will be available. However, the CIC will only have checked this in a broad manner, without becoming too involved in the operational planning responsibilities of subordinates.

The operational level CIC should not - once the plan has been developed and put into effect - consider that his or her operational involvement is at an end. The CIC has the additional responsibilities to oversee execution of the plan by subordinates, and develop contingency plans to counter all foreseeable eventualities that the criminals or other forces may conceive, within the bounds of available funding and other resources. These contingency plans should also be fully capable of being rapidly translated into executable plans at short notice. The Strategic Intention of the campaign plan must also be kept in mind at all times. The contingency plans will to some extent be based on assumptions as to what the criminals might do under certain circumstances. Experience and good planning will reduce the margin of error in these plans, and thereby increase the speed of implementation as the situation demands.

Once a campaign has been launched, the operational level CIC and his staff will busy themselves with the next plan, thereby maintaining the pressure on the criminals and so keeping the initiative.

5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL CIC

The CIC has to ensure that a structure is developed that will be capable of controlling the forces involved in the operations. This structure should be able to accommodate the possibility of foreign security forces being involved, as indeed also own-country forces from outside the TBCA. All these disparate forces should be viewed as synergistic opportunities and made to work together in an efficient manner. The allocation of functional responsibilities

and reporting and command channels are the responsibility of the CIC and to ensure that they work effectively.

The CIC will have to ensure that all levels of command understand the campaign end state and also the various other end states that may arise in subordinate planning. He or she should ensure that no clashes of interest develop as a result of the various plans and that the plans are correctly sequenced and resource priorities properly allocated.

The operational CIC has to analyse the Strategic End State and goal or goals received from higher level. The goal/s need to be broken down further into achievable operational and tactical objectives for lower level subordinates. The CIC should also analyse the goal/s in a manner which enables an understanding of the context at national and TBCA level, within the framework of the given Strategic End State. As described earlier, if a goal is set to end poaching in the TBCA, it must be seen within the National and TBCA context to grasp what the Strategic End State means or should mean. A clear strategic end state must be given in order for the campaign planning to be successful. Where the operational level CIC has not been given a Strategic End State due to circumstance, the CIC should develop one personally and present it for acceptance. Any misunderstandings at this level as to the Strategic End State may well end in a misdirected campaign and a possible failure to achieve meaningful results. Once the Strategic End State is grasped, it becomes easier to develop end states for the operational and tactical levels because together they will form a pyramid ending at the strategic level. The tactical objectives must be sequenced; i.e. not all objectives can be simultaneously achieved and must therefore be carried out in order of priority, to achieve the operational end state in the most cost effective way.

The CIC should protect staff and other subordinates from interference from any source. He or she will function as a buffer and relay for any requests and demands from higher level seniors.

The operational level CIC will decide when and how any reserve forces or funding are allocated in order to maintain the strategic initiative. To do this, however, the CIC must keep in touch with what is going on at ground level so as to maintain a feel for the campaign. Failing to do so may result in an incorrect allocation of resources, often to the loudest voice, and so possibly misdirect the whole campaign.

The operational level CIC should strongly resist the temptation to become involved in the conducting of tactical activities. Not only is this the preserve of his or her subordinates, but the CIC may well lose sight of the big picture while chasing the ball and so fail to carry out his/her responsibilities at higher level.

5.8 CAMPAIGN TERMINATION

The operational level CIC should have a clear understanding of when and how the campaign should end.

During the initial planning, the strategic end state was developed, which will indicate what the situation should resemble when the campaign ends. In other words the campaign must end on favourable terms to the State Departments involved, in line with their departmental mandates or strategies. Other State Departments may in turn use the final end state of the security forces campaign to initiate their own particular campaign.

The operational level CIC must - prior to ending his or her campaign - have a clear understanding of the situation and that success has indeed been achieved.

The CIC must then re-deploy his or her staff or forces in order to capitalise on the situation and prevent any reversion to the previous situation.

The CIC will have to ensure that he or she is able to support any other State Department strategies in the area and thereby assist in achieving a political or State end state. The CIC should then also develop and implement a campaign exit strategy which will tie in with the follow up stager or next campaign plan.

5.9 THE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS

5.9.1 Introduction

As with most problems, the best way to address a challenge is to approach it in a logical and holistic manner. The problem solving process presented here is useful not only for the security environment but also for all situations with minor adaptations. The methodology remains the same even if the complexity of the problem changes.

The security challenges facing a TBCA demand a systematic approach and requires that all available facts be marshalled in preparation for the problem solving process. The size of the problem or challenge will dictate the volume of work required to arrive at a correct solution. For example, poaching as sole issue represents a problem of much smaller scale than that presented by ensuring the security of an entire multinational park.

5.9.2 Analysis Procedure

The problem solving process will first be provided in broad outline to give the reader an overall understanding of the entire process before moving on to the component parts for detailed discussion and analysis.

The following steps need to be followed to go through the process effectively:

The analysis procedure is initiated by either the CEO or his/her political superiors who require that a particular problem affecting the TBCA or State be solved. Usually a National Strategic End State with clearly identified goals will be available for overall guidance, or will have to be developed at ministerial/departmental level or by the CEO. If the CEO is the originator of the analysis procedure then it may be that the problem has no national implications and that the end state would be limited to regional or TBCA level.

The designated operational CIC should analyse the End State and goal/s, as this will allow him/her to arrive at an operational end state and determine lower level goals and objectives to achieve the operational end state. This process is generally referred to as campaign planning. Close aides assist the CIC in developing the plan. The campaign plan is then presented to subordinate officials to guide and direct them in achieving their specific objectives. It is good practice, although not always feasible, to engage such subordinate officials in the development of the operational CIC's campaign plan. Knowing what is expected of them, the subordinate officials then go their own way to develop their own operational plans which need to be integrated with each other and also with the higher level campaign end state.

As part of the next process, the CIC should task the intelligence officials to produce a document detailing the nature of the threat or problem confronting the CIC.

The CIC's campaign planning process continues as follows:

Having received the Intelligence Review of the situation, the CIC will analyze the situation usually according to the headings listed below, and perhaps a few others that may be relevant in a particular situation to arrive at an operational end state. The CIC will also have to analyze the situation in the context of the *strategic* end state handed down from higher level. As indicated earlier, if a strategic end state has not been received the CIC will have to

develop one for higher-level approval to provide context for the entire exercise, following the same procedure as for the CICs own operational end state.

- 5.9.2.1 *Political Constraints:* Consider political resolve – is there a need to demonstrate determination? Avoid alienating various groups, neighbours, etc.
- 5.9.2.2 *Legal:* Laws of Armed Conflict; different approaches to law between countries; powers of security forces; extradition and laws of evidence.
- 5.9.2.3 *Moral:* Attitude of park officials; effect of casualties thus far and in future; attitude of tourists and general population.
- 5.9.2.4 *Time Factor:* How much time is available before deployment; when are results expected; by whom? How long before any forces can begin to operate in terms of a plan?
- 5.9.2.5 *Financial:* Restrictions? Availability?

An example of a strategic end state could be; *“The XYZ TBCA must find itself in a situation where there is political stability and economic well being between the countries involved, with the security situation normalised and only minor poaching occurring from time to time.”*


An example of a operational end state could be; *“The security situation within the XYZ TBCA is of such a nature that the only security forces necessary in the park are the rangers in the field and security guards at the entrance gates, with little criminality except for occasional minor crimes from time to time. The security forces are able to freely conduct anti crime drives across national borders with maximum international cooperation and minimum restrictions.”*

Having identified the operational end state the CIC must determine what he/she feels is the criminal centre of gravity encapsulated within the threat analysis provided by the intelligence officials (as reminder, centre of gravity is that aspect without which an organisation cannot continue or maintain its purpose). Such a centre of gravity could be; *“The poachers ability to use the local population to hide in while disposing game carcasses to the outside market.”*

The CIC will now have to determine lines of operation between the current situation and the desired operational end state. Lines of operation will need to be identified to achieve the end state and also all the decision points and decisive points along each of those lines. Each line or operation must lead the personnel allocated to that specific operation through the criminal's centre of gravity relevant to that operation. Each line of operation will therefore represent a particular operational task or specific operation, for example a line of operation could be *“To prevent the poachers from crossing a particular stretch of park border line”*. Another line could be *“To identify criminal elements in the local population bordering on the park”*. A third line could be *“Socio-economic operations amongst bordering communities to reduce the population's dependence on poaching”*. The CIC will need to identify the critical steps to negate the centre of gravity of each line of operation, thereby achieving the operational end state and collectively also a successful conclusion to the overall campaign.

The lines of operation – as identified by the CIC in conjunction with appropriate staff – are then handed to subordinate managers or officers. These plans will serve as guidelines for the achievement of their own operational plans. The subordinate officers will in turn proceed with their own analyses of the problem in keeping with the guidelines provided to them.

FIGURE 5.2 OUTLINE OF OVERALL CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESS



5.10 PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS LAYOUT.

Below is a framework of the analysis process the tactical level officers will have to follow, in order to develop the activities along a line of operation to reach the operational end state. A detailed discussion of each heading follows after the overview.

5.10.1 Review of the Situation facing the TBCA (Environmental Scan.)

Terrain orientation (physical features of the terrain)
 Threats to the Park. Includes all aspects...criminal, social, etc.
 Security Forces available. Identifies all possible assistance.
 Infrastructure. Built up areas, transport systems, etc.
 Tourism.
 Finance available.
 Anything else of relevance.

5.10.2 **Aim:** Define your Aim. (What do you wish to achieve?) For example, "To combat all criminal/ Illegal activity in the Park".

5.10.3 **End State:** Determine what the End State should be or resemble.

5.10.4 **Factors:** Draw up a list of critical Factors which directly or indirectly affect the problem. These factors will need to be analysed individually and also in terms of their interdependence (e.g. transport, as a factor, is influenced by roads or communication networks/infrastructure). The following can serve as a guideline list of possible factors for analysis:

5.10.4.1 *Terrain:* How does the terrain lend itself to exploitation by the illegal activities of the criminals.

5.10.4.2 *Security Forces:* All organizations that can assist.

5.10.4.3 *Criminal Activities:* What is it that they can do which will affect the Park? (Corruption can be viewed as separate factor if need be.)

5.10.4.4 *Legal:* What is the effect of the law on security force operations and criminals.

5.10.4.5 *Communities:* This will include not only the population living around a TBCA but also people residing within (staff, temporary workers etc).

5.10.4.6 *Tourism:* Where do tourists come from and how do they access the area, where do they stay, what do they tend to visit, methods of travel, peak and trough tourism periods, tourist agencies and structures.

5.10.4.7 *General:* Other factors could be; Infrastructure; IT/ Communications; Finance; Poaching; Stock encroachment; Illegal migrants; Refugees, etc.

5.10.5 Global Conclusions.

This involves listing all the conclusions reached for all the various factors, and developing larger conclusions which draw together all these component sub-conclusions. This process will be described in greater detail later in the main discussion.

5.10.6 Options. Having analysed each factor and come to conclusions in each case, possible options must now be determined. These are very broad scenarios which are not in great detail but encapsulate the conclusions previously reached and yet differ from each of the other options. This aspect will be discussed in more detail later.

5.10.7 Courses of Action. The next step in the process is to thoroughly consider the options identified above to see if various elements of the different options can be combined to arrive at optimum results. This step is referred to as identifying possible *Courses of Action*, and will be discussed in more detail later.

The CoA's are then accurately costed as the final step in confirming the best CoA.

Once accepted, the final CoA is developed into an *Action Plan* giving the required goals, objectives, etc, which are coupled to costs and target dates provided by managers.

The final step is implementation and management.

5.11 DETAILED ANALYSIS PROCEDURE

5.11.1 Review of the situation/environmental scan

5.11.1.1 Terrain Orientation (physical features of the terrain). The requirement for a detailed briefing of the terrain will depend mainly on the current level of knowledge that the CIC has on the terrain. It is usually necessary for at least some briefing on terrain so as to put terrain in perspective relative to the problem and its location. Maps, photographs and diagrams usually assist in such orientation. Terrain also includes the location of built up areas and similar details. At the end of the briefing the audience should have a clear idea of what the terrain looks like and of course the geographic location of the area. It may be advisable at this stage already to examine the terrain and divide it up into rough sectors that are easily identified as geographical entities, thereby facilitating analysis. Should there be a need to divide a terrain into sectors this needs to be formalized, as all subsequent factors will be analysed within these sectors. It may happen that some factors – or elements of a factor – do not lend themselves to such sectoring, but this should not be considered as a serious problem as long as the bigger picture is kept in mind.

5.11.1.2 Threats to the Park. This includes a broad range of issues, including criminal, social, or others. It is critically important that the right questions be asked and thoroughly discussed, as important elements of the criminal or other situation may be overlooked and result in a misdirection of effort. The CIO or delegated staff or members of the intelligence community will normally present the threat situation. This presentation will indicate the type and range of criminal activities under review, but it should also attempt to provide a clearer understanding of who and what the threat consists of and its organization. Photographs, diagrams of the criminal chain of command, inter-connectivity with other organizations, graphs and details of incidents should all be available if required to give the audience a clearer understanding of the total nature of the threat facing the TBCA or relevant area.

5.11.1.3 Security Forces Available. This refers to a complete categorisation of all the security forces available or deployed in the area

whether under control of the TBCA or not. The key issue here is that an organization which may not be under control of TBCA management but still operating in the same area, may well have an influence on criminal activities in that area. This review should include a list of all personnel, vehicles and aircraft available plus their capabilities, restrictions, limitations and periods of deployment. Costs can also be mentioned if relevant. It is often useful to list operational and other bases/locations associated with these security force elements.

5.11.1.4 *Legal Matters.* National and international laws need to be constantly kept in mind and serve as guide during all planning. Legal staff or advice should be readily accessible during the planning phase, as legal input may be required regarding legality and consequences of planned actions.

5.11.1.5 *Communities.* All the various communities present in the area should be listed and discussed. The nature, location, attitude, activities etc of all people living in the area are important in operational planning and actions. It may be important to identify factions or elements within such communities and their allegiances or at least attitudes towards security forces.

5.11.1.6 *Tourism.* What are the actual and potential tourist attractions in the TBCA? What routes will be followed to reach them and what methods of transport are used? Is there a history of attacks in the area, including dates, times and locations? What was the result of these attacks in terms of arrests and convictions? What was the affect on the tourism industry? What are the tourism drivers in the region and what is the spending power/impact of these drivers (i.e. how important is this?).

5.11.1.7 *Illegal persons.* Are there any persons living illegally in the TBCA? If so how many and where do they occur. Where do they come from? How long have they stayed in the park? What are their attitudes towards tourists and the park officials? Do they have a history of criminality? How do they survive, what do they do?

5.11.1.8 *Poaching.* What poaching occurs in the TBCA? Where does it occur and who can be linked to this. What is the history of the poaching and the attitude of poachers towards the rangers/security elements? What tactics, size of groups, leaders, weapons do they have? Are they aggressive? What type of wildlife do they hunt and what are their methods. Do they use transport? Where do they sell or use the poached items. What can be done about the buyers? What is the incidence of bribery amongst TBCA staff in relation to the poachers?

5.11.1.9 *General.* There are many other factors to assess, and the analyst will need to identify those relevant to the situation and proceed accordingly. Nevertheless, all factors identified will need to be analysed as indicated in the discussions below. It is possible that after identifying a factor and doing some preliminary work on it, it becomes clear that a particular factor is irrelevant and can be discarded.

5.11.2 Aim

The CIC usually has one of two situations arising: either he or she is given a mission or task to carry out by seniors or, in the absence of such direction and for whatever reason, he or she decides that a particular action needs to be implemented.

5.11.2.1 *Self-initiated Action:* When such a situation arises and the CIC decides to act on own initiative, the CIC should be guided by some or all of the following aspects:

5.11.2.1.1 Have any general guidelines or intentions been received from higher authority that would enable the CIC to carry out this particular operation within such guidelines/intentions?

5.11.2.1.2 Legal implications of the intended action, if any.

5.11.2.1.3 The abilities and limitations of available forces/resources relative to those available to the opposing forces or the situation being addressed.

5.11.2.1.4 The influence of the population and terrain.

5.11.2.1.5 The nature of the criminals or the problem – which could be anything from a fire, flood or major refugee influx.

5.11.2.2 *Task or Mission Received.* The CIC must analyse instructions in order to clearly understand the full implications of the mission and what outputs are expected. This means considering the following elements:

5.11.3 Operational End State.

In order to determine what the Operational End State should be or resemble, the CIC must examine and base it on the Strategic End State that has been handed down by higher authority. The Operational End State will differ from the higher end state, as the parameters will be more closely drawn at the lower level. The higher level will be aimed more strategically while at ground level the perspective will be more tactical and focused on the details of the task at hand.

5.11.3.1 *Mission Given.* The CIC must assess what precisely is required of him or her. If this can be answered unambiguously then this will form the core of the CIC's mission and form the basis of the tasks handed on to the personnel to be deployed.

5.11.3.2 *Type of Operation.* The nature or type of the operation must be clearly understood. For example, is it a search of an area for hidden contraband, searching for illegal persons, launching a rescue mission of some sort, or do elements of all of these form part of the operation?

5.11.3.3 *The Specific or Possible Tasks.* A number of tasks will be identified from the mission, and means to address these tasks will have to be found during the analysis phase which will now follow. For example, if the mission is to search an area for hidden weapons, then the specific task is clearly one of a cordon and search. Examples of possible tasks that could arise out of a mission to solve a devastating fire or flood might be as follows and can be increased or reduced as the analysis process proceeds:

5.11.3.3.1 Where are suitable areas to launch boats?

5.11.3.3.2 How will the deployed workers reach the disaster area?

5.11.3.3.3 What are the transport logistic implications?

5.11.3.3.4 How are communications going to work?

5.11.3.3.5 How is casualty evacuation going to work? etc.

Having effectively analysed the mission, the aim of the operation must be formulated by the CIC keeping in mind what the Operational End State must be. The CIC's aim must be clear and unambiguous and is based logically on the mission given and the Operational End State. The aim will be in the singular and focus on the most important elements of the task. For example, "*To search area 'X' for hidden illegal weapons and animal traps*". Note that a multiple aim would include, for example, *.....'and stop all illegal poachers from entering the area'*. This would clearly give rise to two different activities with differing focus areas.

The aim must serve as guide throughout the analysis process and serve to focus attention on the reason (aim) for the operation. The aim should also be cleared with higher authority to confirm that efforts are not misdirected.

5.11.4 Analysis of the relevant factors

5.11.4.1 *Terrain*. The analysis of this factor determines the tactical and logistical possibilities of the terrain, and also how it has an influence on the achievement of the criminals objectives.

Terrain is a neutral factor that has an influence on both the criminal and own security forces. The critical aspect of the analysis is to determine how the terrain will influence the criminal's plan of action.

The following aspects may warrant analysis:

5.11.4.1.1 *Topography*. Mountain ranges, summits, plains, densely overgrown areas, swamps and forests. The influence on movement, possible hiding areas and approach-routes as they would affect the opposing sides.

5.11.4.1.2 *Hydrography*. Rivers, dams and lakes.

5.11.4.1.3 *Obstacles*. What natural and man-made obstacles are there and what is their influence on mobility of both sides; i.e the ability to get friendly forces where they need to be and the identification of possible routes around potential obstacles.

5.11.4.1.4 *Infrastructure*. Roads, railway lines, airports, harbours, airfields, power lines etc. How and where do these have an influence on both sides, and so affecting possible plans?

5.11.4.1.5 *Negotiability*. What is the affect of weather and flooding on the mobility of personnel to move in any direction? This relates to both dry and wet seasons.

Conclusions from this factor could cover, in a broad sense, where the criminals may move, set up bases, drive through easily to reach an objective etc. Conversely, what does the

terrain allow own forces to do in attempting to prevent or capture the criminals? A planner could identify possible ambush sites or areas that need to be blocked off to prevent the criminals from passing by or to capture them.

- 5.11.4.2 *Criminal Threat.* There are a number of facts that need to be analysed to achieve positive action that will address the criminal threat. Each fact must be approached in a manner that will lead to a conclusion that ultimately results in an action which is measurable in time and space.
- 5.11.4.3 *Organisation.* By examining the structure of the criminal organisation, the aim is to find an aspect that can be turned in your favour. For example, by carefully examining who and what comprises the structure of a community hosting criminal elements, it may be possible for a member of the intelligence community to infiltrate and gain intelligence as to the next act that the criminals wish to perform. The criminal organisation may consist of people from differing ethnic backgrounds. This offers the potential for this to be exploited by launching an information war against elements of the organisation, resulting in one or more from the gang to surrender or provide information. This in turn provides opportunity to erode the sense of cohesion within the criminal organisation and enable infiltration and subsequent criminal charges to be laid against key or appropriate people. The identification of exploitable trends or habits by the top structure, such as regularly frequenting certain areas/bars etc, also allows for possible infiltration of those places to follow the leaders and so launch operations to arrest them or to conduct deliberate misinformation operations to mislead the leaders into actions in accordance with the needs of security forces. Continuing analysis of a criminal organisation can therefore contribute in a major way towards actions supporting or achieving the operational end state.
- 5.11.4.4 *Tactics and Weapons.* The criminal organisation may have a range of weapons at its disposal. These will have a specific firing range, in accordance with which security personnel will have to be deployed. A conclusion may be that bullet-proof jackets should be provided, along with bullet-proof vehicles under certain conditions. Other conclusions could be that the launching of the operation should occur at night to reduce the effectiveness of their weapons, or deployment of persons by helicopter to achieve surprise which will also contribute towards neutralising the effectiveness of criminal weapons and reducing own casualties. The methods used by a gang to poach game may lead to identifying areas that they are most likely to operate in and therefore deploying people into such areas for pre-emptive action. The tendency to steal and use a particular type of vehicle on certain routes could lead to the identification of certain routes for observation by security observation parties, coupled to the trend that these vehicles may be mainly stolen on certain days and they on average take 'x' length of time to arrive in the area. The size of the gangs will lead one to observe trails and paths in certain areas for signs of use into or out of such areas. These tendencies or routine activities could lead to possible deployments to capitalize on such trends. Knowing the

reaction of the gangs on being discovered may lead to deploying security force elements in a manner calculated to counter such attempts to escape, given that the area has been reconnoitred and analysed effectively as discussed under '*Terrain*'. The attitude of the criminal organisation members towards the local population may lend itself to exploitation and deployment of security forces. The nature of the reaction of gang members to security force activities against them should also be analysed and counter-measures developed, perhaps requiring a measure of retraining of the security elements. These are all actions that will arise out of a detailed analysis, contributing towards effective measures against the threat or problem.

- 5.11.4.5 *Conclusions on Criminal Threat/Problem.* Clearly there are many conclusions that can be made, based on the nature and threat posed by the criminals or problem. The aim is to identify a definite action as an outcome of the analysis, which could help when added to all the other conclusions from the other factors and contribute to an effective plan. An example of a conclusion emanating from factor '*Criminal Threat*' could be that; '*Given that poacher gang (code name Andrew) operate in a gang of twelve and are armed with AK 47 rifles and always operate in the Luvuvhu area on full moon nights and are expected to do so on the 22 April, the SF will deploy patrols into 'x' and 'y' areas to confirm the gang is on route and the possible timings of their arrival at possible poaching sites. The SF will also mount observation posts equipped with night-sight binoculars at points 'a, b, c and d' to confirm target areas of the poachers and mount vehicle patrols in the following areas (e, f, g.) to scare off the poachers from operating in those areas. Once a degree of certainty has been arrived at as to the actions of the poachers a strike force will be activated to deal with the poacher group*'. From the Criminal Threat factor one can only identify certain actions that can take place, but these actions will remain as possibilities until the supporting plans derived from the rest of the analysis have been completed. These will come from analysing other factors which indicate where likely observation posts are to be found, where and what radios and communication systems need to be placed, how long it will take to arrive at the deployment area once the signal has been given and what should be done with any casualties and captured prisoners.
- 5.11.4.6 *Permanent Population.* Most communities living in or adjacent to conservation areas are law-abiding and often assist in broader conservation goals by providing essential services or tourism products. However, as in any community, they may also serve as source for criminal elements. If the majority members of a population in area 'A' are very poor and have difficulty in accessing sufficient food and also have too few jobs to sustain the needs of the community, it may lead to the deduction that some members of the community may be tempted into smuggling and poaching of game. This could also lead to the involvement of criminals from area 'Y' etc using people from impoverished area "A" to carry out their bidding. Conclusions flowing from these deductions could be that security personnel will need to develop or encourage a skills development programme in the area to enable such people to

generate sustainable income. This may turn law-abiding members away from the criminal elements among them and even encourage some of them to provide information on wrongdoers. This then identifies the necessity of having a sound informant handling and payment process. Broad details of this may be as follows: Who is to start the skills development programme, with what resources, starting when, and so on. Further conclusions could be that it is necessary to deploy undercover teams into areas identified from a study done of tendencies or trends, to find possible routes used by the local population into the TBCA and act as the eyes and ears of security units to deal with such incursions. The numbers of teams and the size of the reaction forces could already be suggested although not vital at this stage. Remember the reason for analysing the population: It is to be able to determine what actions are needed by own forces and what the reaction could be to such deployments, as well as the expected actions of the criminal elements.

- 5.11.4.7 *Legal Implications.* Conclusions emanating from analysing the legal implications of any operation are of considerable importance as it may relate closely to public relations aspects and publicity in general. This in turn may affect fund raising and donor funds currently being sourced. Tourism is directly affected by publicity, which has an affect on income. The legal officers involved in planning should consider all the relevant factors affecting the operation, including the following: What are the rules of engagement when in contact with an aggressive criminal? What should be the response in the event of someone being killed or injured? Do Memorandums of Understanding need to be drafted where cross-border operations are considered? Should a lawyer be on hand during the operation and where should he/she be positioned?
- 5.11.4.8 *Time and Distance.* All operations are dependant on time and distance. If it is not known how far it is to a particular place then the time of arrival cannot be determined. This factor embraces all the information relating to routes, land, sea and air plus the influence of weather and time of day or night. The criminal's reaction to the deployment of forces will also have an effect on the movement of the forces and will have to be given due consideration. This needs to be done at a practical level, for example: The actual time it takes to travel at a specific speed along route 'z' with a convoy of vehicles, numbering for example 10. This is repeated with all the possible and relevant routes that the Security units and criminals could use to implement their plans. This factor can best be understood by displaying it tabularly. The analysis will lead a person to the best and or most likely route to approach a particular objective by all parties. The state of readiness, availability and or location of available forces for the operation should be considered, as also the amount of time available to carry out the operation. This is done by identifying '*time now*' and what actions need to be carried out, measured as '*time required*'.

Having established these facts, the next analyses include: is the time available sufficient to carry out the operation? If not, then what should be done to ensure sufficient time, such as for example re-examining time allocated for actions as listed below. Concurrent activity can save

time by, for example, taking along all the groups on the reconnaissance trip. Another important aspect to consider is the travelling time of the component parts of the operation to get to the grouping area, or to the deployment area. Poor timing is a sure way to ruin an otherwise good operation. The various routes for the deployments should be analysed for the effect of time and distance on the operation. Usually the time-tables thus prepared can be used for the writing of the orders and even for the carrying over of the orders. The ultimate conclusion of this factor is to establish whether sufficient time is available, and the proposed start time for the operation.

Time Now:	23 June 12h00.
Do reconnaissance of target area:	5 hours 30 min.
Plan and write operation:	18 hours.
Give orders:	1 hour 25 mins.
Subordinate preparations and reconnaissance etc.	24 hours
Subordinates give orders:	2 hours 40 mins.
Rehearsals for operation:	2 hours 40 mins.
Preparations for move to deployment area:	4 hours 25 mins.
Travelling time to arrive at target:	6 hours 40 mins.
Possible start time of operation: (dependant on many factors including enemy actions)	'x' time
Time taken for operation:	5 hours 30 mins.
Travel back to base:	7 hours 50 mins.
Approximate time back in base:	'y' June

Therefore the start time for the operation will be 'X' hour and this is within the time parameters set for the operation.

5.11.5 Global conclusions

At this stage it may be useful review the completed factors and list all the various conclusions reached. Once this has been done by factor, it should be possible to start identifying main or global conclusions that will bridge the conclusions of a series of factors. Terrain and Criminal Organization may together present a global conclusion that could be something like; *"Security Force observation posts must be placed on the following likely hills 'x', 'y', 'z' looking in the following area for the following poachers 'a', 'b', 'c', with not less than five men each, armed as follows..., due to the strength of the poachers operating in the area. They should deploy on a full moon, the earliest being next week Friday, and they should be dropped off no closer than 'w' place to prevent warning being given. They must be able to stay for at least four days while the reaction force moves into position identified as either 'q' or 't' in order to----- etc".*

This kind of global conclusion will start to formulate a rough plan of action or 'Options' as referred to below. In a well thought out analysis the options to be dealt with next will represent alternative plans, each of which is worthy in its own right but must be weighed up to find the best amongst them.

5.11.6 Options

Having analysed each factor and arrived at conclusions in each case, possible options must now be determined. These need only represent broad scenarios without much detail, but encapsulate the conclusions previously reached. Each option needs to differ from others in at least three aspects (such as timings, deployment of security personnel, movement control on roads etc). Normally an attempt should be made to identify at least three options so as to allow the CIC greater freedom in deciding which option to adopt. The CIC should also

arrange the options in prioritized sequence to allow for subsequent changes of plan and also to develop contingency plans to cover all eventualities.

An option would therefore be a written explanation of one of several methods (options) capable of solving a problem. This method should be a logical and effective way of dealing with the particular problem, but represents only one of the possible choices. However, only one option can ultimately be used although it is possible to combine options and so form an additional option. The option is therefore a concise summing up of a possible solution which if chosen needs to be expanded and formulated as the best course of action to resolve the particular problem. It is useful to diagrammatically illustrate such an option to support and clarify the written material.

Once the CIC has chosen the best options or combination thereof and prioritized them, the staff should develop them into courses of action as indicated below.

5.11.7 Courses of action

The next step in the overall planning process is to thoroughly consider the identified options to see if various elements of the different options can be combined to arrive at optimum results. This step is referred to as identifying possible *Courses of Action*. In doing so the aim is to identify at least two courses of action (CoA) and these will be further developed in detail even to the extent of a fairly accurate costing. Potential CoAs should fit within available funding and other constraints. These potential solutions are now weighed up against each other to determine potential flaws. This sub-process is also looked at from the criminal perspective to see how they would react to the solution. Where shortfalls and opportunities for criminal activities exist, the CoA is adjusted to overcome the identified weakness. Contingency courses of action should cover potential unexpected changes of plan by the criminals, poachers etc.

Having reached this stage it becomes relatively easy to evaluate the CoAs against each other, and to arrive at the best and most cost-effective plan. If one plan is more expensive than another it should not automatically be discarded or necessarily affect the final decision. Additional unanticipated funding may be forthcoming and so affect the final outcome. The suggested and alternative CoA will normally be presented to the responsible person who has authority over the development of the TBCA for approval and selection of the best CoA, and the decision may be based on factors other than finance alone.

The CoA's are then accurately costed as the final step in confirming the best CoA.

Once accepted, the final CoA is developed into an *Action Plan* giving the required goals, objectives, etc, which are coupled to costs and target dates provided by managers.

5.11.8 Action plan

The accepted CoA should now be developed into an Action Plan. This will indicate the various goals and objectives allocated to subordinate managers or officers, and also funding and logistic guidelines or constraints as well as target dates to be adhered to.

Such a plan should include a clear and definite task for each of the role players, indicating who should do what, where, when and with what personnel and equipment. Timings must be given in terms of the start times, completion times and what the end result or state should be. The more strategic the plan the less detail included and the more scope for initiative is left for the subordinate officers. The lower the level of the plan, progressively less initiative will be made available to the junior officials within certain parameters.

An example of a low level tactical plan tasking of a component of a force could be; "*Mr 'X' is to take five rangers and drive in their allocated transport to Redhill and there leave their*

vehicle. They will walk unseen up to the Gansi river and at the first bend after the 'S' establish an observation post with the aim of identifying all people who use the river. They will stay in position until day-break on the fourth day at which stage they will retrace their steps back to base". In reality much more detail could be expected, to ensure precise compliance with the instructions and that the subordinates are fully aware of the CIC's wishes. The more experienced the subordinate the less precise the detail required.

A strategic level tasking of a component of a force could read: "Mr 'X' is to take control of the Southern sector of the park and in so doing bring to an end all illegal acts in the area. A progress report is to be presented at the end of four months. This process will constitute phase one of Operation Thrasher. Successful completion of this phase will result in starting of phase two, subject to the degree of success and any corrective actions needed prior to the start of phase two".

A critical requirement separates the writing of the analysis and the tasking of subordinates, and that is to ensure that the conclusions of the analysis are not only correct but also feasible. To this end the following essential step is required.

5.12 EVALUATION OF THE PLAN

Any plan needs to be evaluated and tested to confirm it can work. The CIC and his/her staff must confirm the feasibility of the plan before it is converted into an operational tasking of the forces available and the final confirmation of the costs of the plan.

The most suitable method to evaluate the feasibility of a plan is to role-play the elements of the plan with the parties involved. This way every person gets to know what they are expected to do and all possibilities are checked and confirmed. The timings and distances should be adjusted for the game plan. The security of the plan must be ensured as this could compromise the operation. It is possible and advisable to change certain dates and place names to hide the nature of the operation from informers if doubt exists as to the security of the plan.

All problems should be identified and investigated to determine solutions. The solution is workshopped to confirm suitability and implemented where acceptable.

5.13 TASKING OF SUBORDINATES


It is not the intention here to be prescriptive as to the method that TBCA managers or security force personnel should use to convey instructions to their subordinates. There are many differing methods which involve both verbal and written formats. Clearly a written format is preferred as it can be referred to repeatedly, promotes close adherence to instructions, and will reduce recriminations later if errors creep into an operation. Verbal explanations supporting and clarifying the written instructions are strongly advised.

The higher up the authority ladder the less need there is for detailed instructions. The intent and the end state may well be all that is necessary to launch a successful operation. Conversely the lower down the more detail is necessary.

5.14 CONCLUSION

The success of any TBCA is dependant on many interlinked factors. Not the least of these is that the park must be administratively well organized, and the security affairs of the area must be properly in place. If the security of a TBCA is poor there may well be fewer animals, tourists, revenue and jobs. Additionally, those who visit the TBCA will be continually subject to petty and grand theft and will go home as bad ambassadors for the TBCA and the countries involved.

FIGURE 5.3 DIAGRAMATIC FLOW OF ANALYSIS PROCEDURE



6. Training, Monitoring, Evaluation

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Criminals adopt new techniques to circumvent existing security measures, technology advances and gives a competitive advantage to those who keep abreast, social and political situations change which require modifications in security approaches...for these and many other reasons it is important that security staff not only be effectively trained to do their job, but that all members have regular refresher or re-training courses to maintain appropriate operational efficiency within a dynamic, continually evolving environment. Unlike in many other service sectors or functional departments, security staff are regularly confronted with situations which may result in legal consequences, media attention or public scrutiny of actions taken during the course of their work. Apprehending a petty criminal may suddenly go very wrong if the thief grabs a hostage and threatens to kill...quick decisions need to be made which have serious consequences if the subconscious and almost intuitive guidance of training and experience is inadequate. So training to provide understanding of the nature, context and consequences of a wide range of security situations is critically important for security staff, and to provide them with the necessary skills and confidence to cope with what usually are unpredictable and unscripted challenges.

However, to effectively discharge their security mandate, managers also need to periodically review and assess how well they are doing in terms of the bigger picture within which they operate...I may be winning a lot of smaller battles, but is this contributing towards achieving the overall security objectives for the area? And so it becomes necessary to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation process which will provide information on how effectively the security mandate is being performed, and what corrective measures may need to be implemented to regain balance and optimal achievement of objectives... indeed even assessment of whether the correct objectives have been formulated!

6.2 TRAINING

The circumstances, resources and expectations faced by security units in different parts of the world vary widely, and it would be inappropriate here to develop a training programme which could simultaneously address the detailed needs of, for example, a remote and sparsely populated jungle TBCA in South America and yet also the needs of a heavily visited TBCA in Europe. Specific detailed training manuals for the various functional units (military, police, immigration, etc) already exist – and often run into several volumes – so all we will try to do here is to outline a generic framework of the kinds of exposure which security elements involved in TBCAs should receive.

Of course maintenance of security within a TBCA is not the sole responsibility of security personnel, but of everyone working within or impacting upon a TBCA. This means that conservation managers, tourism managers and other department managers also need to be trained and exposed to security issues, as they have contributory roles in the maintenance of security in the TBCA. All these people are roleplayers and stakeholders, and they need to understand what the issues are and to contextualize these issues within their own working environment. A security-training programme should therefore also include key 'non-security' officials as target audience.

Below is a proposed outline for a two to three day programme which should cover most of the security aspects relevant to key TBCA stakeholders. The depth of discussion will determine the time required, and should be tailored to meet the needs of the particular target

group. For the purposes of this manual, stakeholders have been clustered into two main groups:

- Security agencies/departments/units involved in the planning, implementation or operations of TBCAs, to provide an understanding of the special circumstances within TBCAs and the various elements and situations involved.
- Conservation and other 'non-security' TBCA officials who need to gain deeper understanding of the need for security measures and nature of security issues.

6.2.1 Cross-functional (Inter-disciplinary) training programme to introduce stakeholders to the various Security elements involved in TBCA management

Module 1: Introductory background

Personal assessment exercise: How much do I know about conservation and security issues? (mini-questionnaire; one-word or yes-no responses, as a self-evaluation which should assist participants at end of course to review whether they benefitted from attendance or not) (10 –20 minutes)

Presentation: The need for biological conservation...why conserve?

Presentation: History of conservation, Protected Areas, leading to TBCAs (including benefits such as biodiversity, socio-economic, collaboration etc)

Presentation: Contrasting and generic examples of Security Issues facing conservation around the world

Module 2: Transboundary Protected Areas in practise

Overview of a specific TBCA as example (processes, successes & failures):

(Instructor must choose a TBCA which the audience can identify with, and the presentation ideally made by someone who has personal experience of the security issues in that TBCA)

Principles and broad content of various International Commitments

- Broad (various international Protocols & Conventions, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity)
- Regional Treaties (portions relevant to TBCA, as affected by agreements in, for example, European Union, ASEAN, SADC, etc)
- Memoranda of Understanding (e.g such as those between the Partner Countries participating in the TBCA)
- Joint Management Plan (according to which the TBCA will be managed across international boundaries)
- Treaty (by which the TBCA is established between partner countries, if such a Treaty is present)

Stakeholder participation (Who? Scale? Processes?)

Institutional frameworks

Working Group Session (What are the likely Security Issues in TBCAs? Working groups to be separated into conservationist and security personnel groupings; This is an exercise to illustrate to the people during plenary feedback how the two groups have different perspectives regarding 'Security' and how both groups are also still likely to have missed many important elements).

Module 3: Security Issues

Implications of free movement of wildlife (disease, threats to people, etc)

Implications of less restricted movement of people (Immigration, customs & excise, border posts, etc)

Tourist sensitivities and perceptions

Community issues
 Legal issues
 Operational issues (use of force, joint operations, standardisation, etc etc etc)
 Communications
 Management of emergencies and disasters
 Roles and responsibilities
 Operational areas and bases
 War and conflict situations

Module 4: The security planning and implementation process

Module 5: Field trip

To expose people to border situations in conservation areas (for example, accompany a Ranger Scout group on simulated anti-poaching operation to experience firsthand the limitations and challenges faced in resources, communications, and the conditions associated with a patrol through bush or forest. What equipment is required, what kind of person is required, what kind of conditions do you have to cope with, how do you arrest a poacher, what do you do with the poacher after arrest, etc etc)

Module 6: Review of course achievements and possible follow-up requirements

(break-up into a few working groups to produce review outputs, and then a facilitated plenary feedback and discussion)

6.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Identifying security challenges and allocating resources and responsibilities to address these challenges represents a good start, but reality checks need to be built in to review how appropriately and effectively mandates are being pursued and objectives reached...i.e. *“Although we are all working very hard, are we truly making a difference to the security situation and are we doing so in the most effective way using all available resources”?*

Most organisations and institutions have a clear Vision and/or Mission which they consider to be the primary mandate or purpose for their existence, and these higher level Vision or Mission statements are underpinned by various hierarchies of goals and objectives aimed at achieving the Vision and Mission. This should also be true for TBCAs and the constituent conservation areas making up such TBCAs. Effective organisations will have infrequent review processes to test whether the Vision and Mission statements are still relevant, more frequent review to see if Objectives remain appropriate, and regular assessments to see if meaningful progress is being achieved in reaching the objectives.

TBCAs and conservation areas differ internationally, within one country, and sometimes even within one TBCA in terms of the level they have reached in developing management planning and objectives frameworks for constituent areas. It is therefore difficult to develop a set of generic questions which could be asked to test the efficiency in which the security mandate of a TBCA is being achieved. Even so, we suggest a series of questions below which could be the basis of a simple analysis of whether the security processes and issues within a TBCA are being effectively employed or addressed. While perhaps simplistic at first glance, the questions remain relevant for the most sophisticated of TBCAs and also those in the earliest stages of development. The answers to these questions should provide some guidance as to where shortfalls exist and where improvements may be required.

1. Compile a comprehensive list of issues which represent the full scope of security threats or impacts within the TBCA.

2. Has responsibility and authority been assigned to a specific person or unit for each of the elements listed above?
3. Is such responsibility and authority as referred to in 1 and 2 above present in each of the component areas making up the TBCA?
4. How well is each of these issues being addressed?

Issue	Consistent underachievement	Limited but clear progress	Generally acceptable, some shortfalls	Consistently well
Plant poaching				
Animal poaching				
Arson				
Theft				
Smuggling				
Poor communication				
etc				

5. Is there opportunity for periodic review of security issues?

None at all	Rarely, less than annual	Once a year	Regular, scheduled meetings

6. Are the various security issues being ranked in terms of importance, and available resources being allocated accordingly?
7. Are security issues receiving the policy, budgetary and management support they require?

Issue	Policy support			Budgetary support			Management support		
	Poor	Can improve	Good	Poor	Can improve	Good	Poor	Can improve	Good
Plant poaching									
Animal poaching									
Arson									
Theft									
Smuggling									
Poor communication									
etc									

8. What are the factors contributing to sub-optimal achievement of security objectives (if any)?

Issue	Poor planning	Lack of funds	Staff shortage	Poor collaboration	etc	etc
Plant poaching						
Animal poaching						
Arson						
Theft						
Smuggling						
Poor communication						
etc						


9. What is being done to remedy any current or potential shortfall in addressing security issues?
10. Do meetings take place which bring together across boundaries the following TBCA stakeholders or roleplayers:
 - rangers of the various partner countries
 - border police of the various partner countries
 - conservation managers
 - other security stakeholders
11. Are there structured meetings/forums enabling periodic interaction between:
 - different security stakeholders (eg. police and defence force and immigration authorities etc)
 - conservation managers and security managers
 - security managers and communities
 - etc
12. Do effective infrastructural means exist for communication within and between the various areas making up the TBCA, such as:

Radio	Telephone (landline)	Telephone (mobile)	e-mail	roads	landing strips for aircraft	etc
13. Are these communication methods being effectively used?
14. Have effective procedures for routine and emergency communication within and between security stakeholders been established?
15. Are these procedures being effectively implemented?
16. Have protocols or guidelines been developed for optimal operations and mutual assistance in the event of cross-border 'hot-pursuits' and similar international situations having legal implications?
17. etc etc

It is important that these monitoring actions be effectively evaluated and incorporated into the overall management process. While self-policing occurs to some extent within each section or unit within an organisation (we all practice self-criticism and adopt remedial actions within our own work), it is important that independent review also take place from outside the particular unit or section.

In Figure 6.1 we outline a simplified process for periodic evaluation of broad progress towards achieving the security objectives in a TBCA.

FIGURE 6.1: THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION CYCLE



7. Key Lessons Learned

A substantial number of TBCAs have been established in various parts of the world in recent years, yielding many lessons and a considerable degree of understanding of processes and associated difficulties. As far as Security arrangements are concerned, it is difficult to generalize because the security challenges vary so widely in different parts of the world, and even in different parts of a Region. Nevertheless, some key insights and lessons can be extracted, and are offered below.

7.1 INVOLVE KEY SECURITY AGENCIES EARLY IN THE TBCA PLANNING STAGES

Big ideas often have humble beginnings, and so too in the case of TBCAs. It will in many cases be a few conservationists talking to colleagues across the border about the benefits of linking the contiguous areas through compatible management. The Concept Plans that may flow from these ideas are usually also drafted by conservationists, and only some time later when the idea is on a roll at higher political level does it become apparent that critical national security roleplayers need to be engaged and involved. It then takes a period of time to convince these security stakeholders that they need to be involved in something the security people may initially perceive as a group of environmentalists running off again on some 'Save the Planet' scheme, that they should allocate time and resources in an already crowded schedule and tight budget, and that they should expend focussed energy and thought on a theme (conservation) which is not quite within their normal ambit of activities, and a certain degree of reticence may have to be overcome. This results in a hiccup in the planning and implementation process which creates frustration at various levels, often right up to ministerial political level. To avoid such delays and frustrations, and to develop plans that are integrated and don't have to be modified (often drastically) at a late stage due to the concerns of a critical security stakeholder, it is essential that all key security departments (Police, Defence, Intelligence, Immigration, Customs & Excise, etc) be involved early in the TBCA planning and implementation phases. Not only will this allow the various security departments to develop a clear understanding of the motivations for the TBCA and therefore become willing partners at an early stage with appropriate input and cooperation, but it allows these agencies to prepare budgets to accommodate the security needs of the TBCA implementation phase. Even relatively low expenditures involved in planning phases such as repeated helicopter or other inspection flights of border areas, travel and accommodations costs, etc will strain budgets and cause irritation if such agencies did not have advance warning, and may require assistance from donor agencies and thereby contribute to depleting funding sources. When larger expenses are involved, such as the creation of new border posts and employment of new staff, then many of these departments work in three-year cycles and cannot accommodate shorter term demands for capital expenditure.

7.2 THERE IS GREAT BENEFIT IN AN OVERALL, CENTRALIZED SECURITY MANAGEMENT UNIT

TBCA managers need to consciously recognize that the success of a conservation area is dependent not only on Finance, Human Resources, Tourism, Wildlife Conservation and the other traditional divisions or emphases, but equally also Security. As a cross-cutting issue it is difficult to adequately allocate responsibility for Security to any one of the traditional line departments, especially in current times when security threats have become increasingly sophisticated and pervasive. While elements of security may be embedded within each of the more traditional line departments (Tourism will have their Gate Guards, Shop Security Guards, etc; Wildlife Conservation will have their Rangers and Scouts etc, and so on), there is a very real need for overall co-ordination and streamlining to avoid duplication, assumptions that someone else is fulfilling a particular function, and ensuring a 'Bigger

Picture' is maintained. Having an overall centralized security management centre also dramatically contributes to effective crisis or disaster management such as in the case of hijackings, aircraft crashes, border clashes and refugee episodes, etc. In such cases the centralized management facility will function as an Incident Management Centre to coordinate the various de-centralized security roleplayers, both within and outside the TBCA. There is nothing that destroys tourist or public confidence as much as a delayed, unprofessional and unco-ordinated response to a security crisis, and such a damaged image always takes a very long time to recover, sometimes associated with loss of tourism revenue. In the case of a TBCA, these security issues take on an international cross-border dimension, potentially affecting national relations, and therefore becomes critical that a dedicated and specialized security management centre be instituted to integrate and coordinate security activities not only within a particular component of a TBCA, but also between different components.

7.3 ENGAGE IN A THOROUGH PROCESS OF BROAD STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

'Security' should not be viewed by TBCA planners from a negative and narrow perspective restricted to punishment and retribution, but rather in a broader holistic manner which addresses all the issues that will make the TBCA more 'secure'. This includes ensuring effective information exchange between all stakeholders involved in the development of a TBCA, so that complete understanding of the motivations and benefits of the TBCA are understood and 'buy-in' achieved by all parties. It will probably not be possible to please everyone, but if effective information exchange and public participation did occur, then a majority consensus will support the process of implementation of the TBCA and make it much more difficult for detractors to gain a significant 'voice'. If the TBCA has followed due process and enjoys broad support, it makes the TBCA more secure. Local communities neighbouring a TBCA, especially those having low levels of literacy and precarious income, easily have their expectations raised by talk of increased tourism and job opportunities etc, making it essential that all discussions should be well understood, open and truthful. Disillusioned, poverty-stricken communities can result in chronic long-term security problems of poaching, theft, negative image to tourists, and poor media representation.

7.4 FAIR PRACTICE CONTRIBUTES TO A MORE STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Care should be taken to engage in fair practise, and not to (for example) favour one NGO over another without good and defensible reasons. Such unfair practice on the part of TBCA planners or managers could easily result in the alienation of goodwill or outright resentment, which may lead to disruptive influences where communities or other key stakeholder groupings are sometimes misled or manipulated into actions detrimental to the TBCA.

7.5 HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECURITY ISSUES AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM

An integrated security network and plan contributes in very large measure to the successful maintenance of security within a TBCA. This will require an institutional framework allowing all security stakeholders to meet periodically for information exchange, discussion of security issues, and maintenance of an agreed-upon security framework. This security framework is underpinned by having a clear understanding of what the security issues are within a TBCA, that all the necessary security stakeholders are involved to properly engage the spectrum of security issues, that all security stakeholders have a clear understanding of who is responsible for what, and that the necessary communications and other infrastructure are in place.

7.6 CONFLICTING LEGISLATION AND MUTUALLY AGREED 'RULES OF ENGAGEMENT'

Incompatible legislation applicable in different components of a TBCA complicate, delay and sometimes render security functions inefficient. It is therefore necessary that security stakeholders meet, identify and discuss mechanisms to address conflicting legislation early in the planning or implementation process of a TBCA. This may require that specific issues be taken up in the TBCA International Establishment Treaty or other contractual undertaking, or legislative processes engaged in to attempt harmonising of legislation between the TBCA Partner Countries, or at the very least a mutual understanding be developed and accepted by TBCA partners on 'Rules of Engagement' to deal with emergencies or situations of mutual impact or concern regarding operations affected by the international boundary line.

7.7 CLARITY OF FUNCTIONS AND LINES OF INTERACTION

Although implied and sometimes clearly stated in foregoing sections, it bears emphasising that with so many security stakeholders involved in a TBCA, a clear understanding must be maintained amongst all roleplayers regarding roles, functions and responsibilities, and that clear structures for interaction are developed, and that clear lines of communication are established. Having such clear structures and mechanisms will contribute towards reducing friction, tension, misunderstandings and shortfalls in efficiency.